ABB Advant Master Online Builder

View CSAF

Summary

ABB became aware of vulnerability in the products versions listed as affected in the advisory, where an incorrect version of Online Builder (ONB) was included in the media. An update is available that resolves the vulnerability, see details in Recommended immediate actions.

The following versions of ABB Advant Master Online Builder are affected:

• Control Builder A <=1.4/4 (CVE-2025-13162)
• 800xA for Advant Master <=6.0.3-1, <=6.1.1-1, 6.1.1-3, 6.2.0-1 (CVE-2025-13162, CVE-2025-13162, CVE-2025-13162, CVE-2025-13162)

Background

• Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing
• Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
• Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland

Vulnerabilities

Acknowledgments

• ABB PSIRT reported this vulnerability to CISA.

Notice

The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB. ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the scope of vulnerability? – An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could insert and run arbitrary code in an affected system node. What causes the vulnerability? – The vulnerability is caused by not having restricted permission on an application directory where DLL files are stored. What is Advant Master Online Builder? – Online Builder is part of Control Builder A, being a set of applications for configuration and programming of Advant Master controllers. Online Builder is also part of 800xA for Advant Master, an extension package to System 800xA connecting to Advant Master controllers. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? – An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability can run arbitrary code in an affected node. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? – An attacker who obtains the necessary access could exploit vulnerability by placing malicious DLL´s in the unrestricted application directory, leading to unauthorized code execution and compromising system integrity. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? – No, to exploit this vulnerability an attacker would need to have physical access to an affected system node. Can functional safety be affected by an exploit of this vulnerability? – No. What does the update do? – The update of the Online Builder (ONB) resolves the vulnerability by adding restrictions to the application folder, requiring authentication. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? – No, ABB identified this vulnerability through its internal security assessment and verification processes. When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? – No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

Advisory Conversion Disclaimer

This ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT 7PAA020047 from a direct conversion of the vendor’s Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA’s website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided « as-is » for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.

Revision History

• Initial Release Date: 2026-06-23

Legal Notice and Terms of Use